‘It’s Kinda Punishment’: Tandem Logics and Penultimate Power in the Penal
Voluntary Sector for Canadian Youth
Abstract
This paper draws on original empirical research in Ontario, Canada which analyses
penal voluntary sector practice with youth in conflict with the law. I illustrate how
youth penal voluntary sector practice (YPVS) operates alongside, or in tandem with the
statutory criminal justice system. I argue that examining the PVS and the statutory
criminal justice system simultaneously, or in tandem, provides fuller understandings of
PVS inclusionary (and exclusionary) control practices (Tomczak and Thompson 2017).
I introduce the concept of penultimate power, which demonstrates the ability of PVS
workers to trigger criminal justice system response toward a young person in conflict
with the law. My novel concepts of tandem logics and penultimate power are useful for
understanding PVS practice, explaining how seemingly contradictory approaches
across state and ‘community’ organizations not only co-exist, but depend upon the
tandem relationship between the PVS and the statutory criminal justice system.
Introduction
This paper provides a global first examination of the youth penal voluntary sector and a fresh
analysis of ‘helping’ penal power. It illustrates how the penal voluntary sector operates alongside, or
in tandem with the statutory criminal justice system. I argue that examining the penal voluntary
sector and the statutory criminal justice system simultaneously, or in tandem, provides fuller
understandings of penal voluntary sector inclusionary (and exclusionary) control practices1. I
introduce the concept of penultimate power, which demonstrates the ability of penal voluntary sector
workers to trigger criminal justice system responses toward a young person in conflict with the law.
My novel concepts of tandem logics and penultimate power are useful for understanding penal voluntary
sector practice, explaining how seemingly contradictory approaches (e.g. inclusionary/exclusionary)
across organizations (e.g. police and penal voluntary sector organizations) not only co-exist in youth
justice, but are dependent upon the tandem relationship between the penal voluntary sector and the
statutory criminal justice system. This paper draws on original empirical research in Ontario, Canada
analysing YPVS practice. In Canada, youth justice legislation has federal jurisdiction and applies to

1

youth between the ages of 12 and 18. I examine relationships between the penal voluntary sector
and the criminal justice system and develop Valverde’s (2010) examination of security logics by
focusing on “how best to imagine shifting relations” (p.12) in dynamic penal projects. This article
contributes to the emerging scholarship of the penal voluntary sector as an important site and actor
in criminal justice systems around the world (see for example Tomczak and Buck, 2019; Corcoran et
al., 2018) by examining the everyday practice of penal voluntary sector work which produces
complex forms of inclusion and exclusion for youth in conflict with the law.
The penal voluntary sector refers to non-profit organizations that work at micro and macro
levels with people, policies and issues that connect to the criminal justice system and crime
(Tomczak, 2017). For example, on a micro level these organizations often work on a case
management basis with those in conflict with the law and their families before, during and after their
engagement with police, courts, probation and corrections elements of the criminal justice system.
On a macro level, penal voluntary sector organizations might develop advocacy campaigns or
research issues related to crime and the criminal justice system. In the contemporary penal voluntary
sector in Canada, much of the programming for those in conflict with the law is classified into the
mutually exclusive categories of men, women and youth. This article refers to the Youth Penal
Voluntary Sector (YPVS) to refer to voluntary sector organizations which fall under the mandate of
youth justice. The voluntary sector’s role in responding to youth in conflict with the law in Canada
predates the separate statutory youth justice system (Maurutto, 2003; Chen, 2005). From earlier ideas
about needy children who require saving from negligent and poor families, to more modern notions
of dangerous youth requiring risk-based interventions, governing approaches to children and youth
have helped to shape notions of public and private responsibility (Tilton, 2010). Indeed, the creation
of the juvenile delinquent was predicated on the recognition of adolescence as a separate category of
personhood deserving of special public and private consideration (Ruddick, 2003). Examinations of
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the role of the voluntary sector are connected with the contested terrain regarding the role and
function of government in society. That non-state actors, like the penal voluntary sector play a
policing and punitive role to youth in conflict with the law, relates to debates and issues surrounding
the state monopoly on crime control and/or the role of privatization in crime control (Garland,
2001). Furthermore, that the penal voluntary sector plays a role in exclusion challenges conceptions
about the voluntary sector as playing a supportive and civic engagement role (Tomczak, 2017).
Enacted in 2003, Canada’s current youth justice policy is the Youth Criminal Justice Act. This
legislation has been described as a bifurcated youth justice policy (c.f. Minaker and Hogeveen,
2009:73), reflecting the criminal justice system’s “bifurcation of control” (Rose, 2000; Garland,
2001). Innes (2003: 11) explains: “The socially included sections of society, when subject to censure
for engaging in deviant acts, tend to be subject to reintegrative forms of control, whereas, individuals
drawn from more economically and politically marginalized groups, are dealt with via means that
serve to reinforce their exclusion”. The Youth Criminal Justice Act division of “young offenders
into two groups of serious and minor also underlies an assumed division of responsibility between
the state and the community in managing them” (Campbell, 2005:19 emphasis added). The community
role is predominantly fulfilled by the YPVS. In the province of Ontario, the Ministry of the Attorney
General and the Ministry of Child and Youth Services primarily undertake the responsibility to
provide institutions and services to realize the principles and operations of the Youth Criminal
Justice Act. The YPVS and other non-state actors are funded by these two ministries as transfer
payments organizations “external to government to fund activities that benefit the public and are
designed to achieve public policy objectives” (Government of Ontario, n.d.). The YPVS is
significant, both in terms of the number of organizations that it is comprised of and proportions of
the youth justice budget. The Ministry of Child and Youth Services funds approximately 200
organizations to achieve policy objectives from the Youth Criminal Justice Act. The funding of these
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programs comprises over half of the youth justice services budget in the province (Auditor General
of Ontario, 2014).
The YPVS, like the adult PVS, is “enmeshed in the day-to-day operation of the criminal justice
system” (Hucklesby and Corcoran, 2016: 1). For example, YPVS organizations (like Elizabeth Fry
Society’s-Marjorie Amos) operate open custody facilities which are often smaller and have less
security features when compared to secure custody facilities (see also Gray and Salole, 2006). YPVS
organizations, like the John Howard Society, play a supervisory and verification role for youth who
do not have a surety before court appearances on the bail supervision program. YPVS organizations
like Associated Youth divert youth from the statutory criminal justice system in programs called
extra-judicial measures and extra-judicial sanctions. Larger YPVS organizations (like Springboard)
often offer a range of youth justice programs and services alongside other programming not
connected to the youth criminal justice system (e.g. housing for youth with developmental
disabilities).
Criminologists continue to assess the impacts of Canada’s Youth Criminal Justice Act and
there remains no general consensus regarding assessments about the exclusionary effects of the
policy (see for example Alain, Reid and Corrado, 2016; Smandych, Dyck, La Berge, and Koffman,
2016). While the youth crime rate was experiencing a decline in the late nineties, the Youth Criminal
Justice Act, enacted in 2003, is sometimes attributed with reductions in the number of youth
charged by the police and the per capita rate of custodial sentences (Bala and Carrington, 2015).
Boyce (2015) for example observes that since the implementation of the Youth Criminal Justice Act
“the rate of youth dealt with by other means has continued to be higher than the rate of youth
formally charged, although this difference has been narrowing since 2009” (p. 22). In 2014, almost
half (48%) of accused youth were charged by police and processed through the statutory criminal
justice system. The remaining 52% were processed through other means including being warned or
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cautioned by police or referred to the YPVS. In the province of Ontario, custody admissions (a
useful proxy data point for youth incarceration), declined by 72% between 2003 and 2014 and
detention admissions declined by 33% in the same period (Ministry of Children and Youth Services
2016). In contrast to jurisdictions like the state of Texas in the United States where the reduction of
youth sent to state-run corrections institutions resulted in expansion of mass incarceration (Cate,
2016), Ontario’s decrease in youth incarceration has resulted in the closure of both YPVS operated
and state operated facilities. Most significantly, the Roy McMurtry Youth Center, the largest of
Ontario’s secure custody and detention facilities cited low incarceration rates as the primary reason
for its slated closure as a youth facility (Minister of the Solicitor General 2016). Similarly, closures of
open custody facilities, primarily operated by the YPVS, has resulted in the elimination of 68% of
the beds available for youth in conflict with the law since 2003. Despite these closures, the Ministry
of Children and Youth Services continue to be concerned about “excess capacity” (Ministry of
Children and Youth Services 2016: p.11) and low "utilization rates" (Ministry of Children and
Youth Services 2016: p.24) in youth custody facilities across the province.
Importantly, this trend toward less incarceration and an inclination to “define deviance
down” (Garland 1996) has not been felt evenly for all youth in conflict with the law. In particular,
Indigenous and Black youth continue to have high rates of incarceration. Malakieh (2018) shows
Aboriginal youth made up 46 % of admissions to correctional services in 2016-17 while making up
only 8% of the youth population. A March 1, 2013 Toronto Star article reports that the proportion of
jail admissions for Black youth is four times higher than when compared to the general young male
population2. The trend of disproportionate representation of youth of colour is also relevant in other
jurisdictions. In the United States, Black and Latino youth are disproportionately represented as
criminal victims and offenders and are overrepresented in all aspects of the juvenile justice and
criminal justice systems (Brame et al. 2014). Similarly more than half of the youth in prisons for
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young people in England and Wales are from a black and minority ethnic background (HM
Inspectorate of Prisons, 2019). While there is a paucity of information about social demographics
like race in the Canadian criminal justice system, there is far less information about the racial identity
of people who are referred to the penal voluntary sector by statutory agencies. This is an important
area of research deserving of further scholarship. In particular, data on legal factors (like types of
offences) and extra-legal factors (like social demographics) that inform who is referred to the penal
voluntary sector from statutory agencies could shape a better understanding of the inclusionary
and/or exclusionary effects of the penal voluntary sector as well as the discretionary power of
statutory agencies like the police, probation and the courts.

Methodology
This article is based on the findings of a broader research project that combines institutional ethnography
(Smith 1987; 2005) and governmentality approaches (Foucault, 1991). Governmentality scholars
recognize how ‘discursive practices’ of particular knowledges and how knowledge is applied to the social
world. Considerations of logic or political rationalities examine “…the moral justifications for particular
ways of exercising power by diverse authorities, notions of the appropriate forms, objects and limits of
politics, and conceptions of the proper distribution of such tasks among secular, spiritual, military and
familial sector” (Rose and Miller, 1992: 175). This recognition connects with Valverde’s (2010) security
framework which includes an analysis of the logic of projects. Valverde (ibid.) notes, “relations among
different logics are complex, unpredictable and site-specific: an increase in the popularity or reach of one
logic does not necessarily bring about a decline in another logic” (p.11). As such it is important to
examine how different logics can and do co-exist. Smith’s institutional ethnography (1987; 2005) as both
a theory and method for understanding social relations helped build methodological tools to understand
how logics operate within an everyday lived experiences that are organized by social relations that are not
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observable within that reality. Given my interest in understanding how YPVS work is shaped by social
relations, institutional ethnography is well suited to understanding work and in particular social service
work (c.f. De Montigny, 1995; Ng, 1996; Nichols, 2014). Despite ontological and epistemological
differences between Smith and Foucault, combining aspects of their methodologies is useful because of
their respective contributions to understanding the relationship between power and knowledge (c.f. Satka
and Skehill, 2012; Nichols, 2014).
I used multiple data points to build an understanding of how the YPVS works with/for/through
the statutory criminal justice system. The YPVS programs discussed in this research are offered
exclusively to youth in conflict with the law and do not necessarily represent the full spectrum of the
penal voluntary sector, like policy advocacy programs (Tomczak, 2017). Twenty-four people were
interviewed from a range of YPVS organizations and the statutory criminal justice system. Twenty
respondents worked in the YPVS as paid employees, 2 were Police Officers and 2 were Probation
Officers. Interviews were designed as an open-ended inquiry semi-structured by an interview guide.
My focus was to gather detailed accounts of participants’ work processes and also to better understand
how they approached their work. Other data sources included field observations in courts and penal
voluntary sector organizations, document collection (e.g. annual reports, youth intake forms, case
notes), and a YPVS database generated from freedom of information requests.
This sample of YPVS workers involved those who receive a referral to work with youth in
conflict with the law from the police, courts or probation. The title for this article, “it’s kinda
punishment” cites research participant Meredith3, and reflects the lack of clarity surrounding the
intention behind YPVS work. Specifically, the elision between helping and punishment results in,
even YPVS workers, questioning their role in the criminal justice system. Frequency and contact
between the YPVS and the statutory criminal justice system vary by program. A commonality across
programs is that YPVS intervention with young people in conflict with the law is coordinated by the
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criminal justice procedure. For example, YPVS organizations are expected to provide the court and
probation with summary reports of their work with youth in conflict with the law at court dates for
youth in the bail supervision program or before their probation expires. That YPVS work is
organized around the criminal justice system, instead of, for example, a young person’s preference or
progression in YPVS programming is an important orientation of YPVS work. There are important
distinctions in the level of choice youth in conflict with the law experience in YPVS programs. For
example, there is no element of choice in relation to carceral punishment and Attendance Centre
sentences. Here, elements of ‘choice’ are limited to programming options or contrived choices, but
the actual assignment of punishment is not a choice. Even within these mandated YPVS programs,
assessments from YPVS workers can contribute to how youth are processed in the justice system.
Importantly, more research is required on how penal voluntary sector work shapes decision making
by police, courts and probation (Quirouette, 2017). An important theme in this article is that even
YPVS workers are not confident about the impact they have on youth criminal justice system. There
is, however, a case to be made that YPVS work influences criminal justice professionals like police,
probation officers and judges. For example, if a YPVS worker employed in an open-custody facility
determines that a young person was not compliant while serving their sentence and as a result wrote
unfavourable assessments and reports about a young person these negative assessments could justify
a more punitive or carceral response in the future.
YPVS programs like Bail Supervision programmes and Extrajudicial Measures programmes
involve more opportunities for choice as youth choose to participate in these programs instead of a
criminal justice sentence which could restrict their freedom more significantly. The choice of
participation by the offender significantly “demarcates it from other forms of criminal justice
intervention, where ordinarily offenders would have no such choice” (Thomas and Bull, 2013: p.
589). This arrangement, where penal voluntary sector workers receive a referral from the criminal
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justice system, is significant because it is a precursor to a dynamic where penal voluntary sector
workers have the power to initiate further exclusionary effects by (re)involving police, courts or
probation. This is the most coercive action penal voluntary sector workers can engage in with youth
in conflict with the law and is discussed in subsequent sections.
Tandem Logics
While neither the YPVS nor the criminal justice system have a monopoly on any one logic, a
division of labour exists between the two that is predicated on the YPVS employing a helping (or
inclusionary) logic, and the criminal justice system a punitive (or exclusionary) logic. The
arrangement where youth in conflict with the law are responded to by, first, the criminal justice
system and, then, the YPVS marries the YPVS to the criminal justice system and creates a dynamic
which invites comparison between the two entities. There is a tandem quality in the way the power
relations in the criminal justice system and the YPVS are described as a result of the distinct division
of labour and mandates. The notion of working in tandem recognizes that there is a certain level of
acknowledgement of prominent logics by the YPVS and the criminal justice system. Here, the YPVS
acknowledges that the criminal justice system is more punitive, and the criminal justice system
recognizes that the YPVS has a more pronounced helping logic. As a result of this recognition,
reified by criminal justice referrals to the YPVS (ostensibly for inclusion) and YPVS unsuccessful
files being returned back to the criminal justice system (for exclusion), there is an interplay between
the presumed dominant rationalities of the YPVS and the criminal justice system.
This duality leads to a false dichotomy and assumes inclusionary qualities of the YPVS
(Tomczak and Thompson, 2017: p.16) while distorting the role of punishment in the YPVS. This
observation that community involvement is falsely equated with treatment or rehabilitation is one
widely observed by scholars of punishment (Armstrong, 2002; Garland, 2018; Hannah-Moffat and
Maurutto, 2012; Miller, 2014). Studies documenting alternatives to custody document how
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community-based alternatives to the criminal justice system replicate punitive accountability
approaches that are associated with prison. Similarly, Moore (2011) in an examination of drug
treatment courts demonstrates that “benevolence and coercion can be two sides of the same coin”
(p. 257). Following, Valverde’s (2010) security framework, the question of how a helping logic can
co-exist with more punitive logics in the YPVS work can be partially answered through an
examination of how penultimate power operates in the YPVS. This dynamic between the YPVS
and the criminal justice system contributes to the supposition of tandem logics between the YPVS
and the criminal justice system.
Penultimate Power
YPVS workers in this investigation have the ability to initiate work sequences which would trigger a
response from the criminal justice system toward a young person in conflict with the law (the YPVS
client). The ability of YPVS workers to set in motion exclusionary effects is penultimate: YPVS
workers report youth who are not meeting program expectations to police, courts and probation and
ultimately it is the criminal justice system that proceeds with criminal charges and/or further
entrenchment of young people with the criminal justice system. This once removed division of
labour between the YPVS and the criminal justice system contributes to the tandem relationship
because when the YPVS is the most exclusionary towards young people in conflict with the law,
they are actually referring the young person back to the criminal justice system where the referral of
the young person originates. Conversely, the statutory criminal justice system is ostensibly more
inclusionary when police officers, probation officers and judges use their discretion to refer young
people in conflict with the law to the YPVS rather than the statutory criminal justice system.
Penultimate power is an important organizing feature for YPVS workers who, as my
research demonstrates, purposefully explain and remind their youth clients that as a YPVS worker
they have a communication channel with the statutory criminal justice system. Even when YPVS
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workers’ exercise of their penultimate power resulted in outcomes like youth incarceration, YPVS
workers often consider these activities as just one part of their overall position of ‘helping’ youth
and therefore one incident which could be understood as exclusionary was not reflective of their
overall ‘helping’ approach. A common sentiment shared was: By the very nature of the referrals
from the criminal justice system, it is inevitable that a certain number of youth are going to continue
to be entrenched in this system. Research participant Regina explained that youth referred to the
YPVS, “are no angels” suggesting that there were limits to how much YPVS workers can protect
youth from exclusionary effects. Regina’s sentiment that not all youth referred to the YPVS will be
helped or protected by the YPVS from exclusionary effects is an important one and shared by a
number of YPVS research participants. For example, Shelley who has experience working as both a
Probation Officer and in the YPVS, explains that the act of removing her youth client from the Bail
Supervision program can be considered an act of care and one that is a consequence of the young
person’s actions and not hers.
I make it crystal clear to them how they would not succeed in the bail program, I
say to them, if you do this, I’m gonna pull. If you do this, I’m gonna pull and then
if I don’t do it, what is that telling them? ….Toward the end of my days doing the
bail program I was really clear that I was doing them a favour by pulling. I was
doing them a favour because I am letting them feel the consequences of their
actions … A lot of these kids need to recognize that there are consequences to their
actions. And that can be a huge life lesson for them. And as far as I’m concerned
that is not even me doing that to them. I think this now as a Probation Officer.
That is them doing the behavior that gets them breached, I’m just the messenger
to the powers that be.
For Shelley, then, penultimate power can be configured as an act of care and evidence of a YPVS
worker being responsible by playing the role of “messenger” to the criminal justice system, rather
than colluder. Importantly, Shelley’s relationship with youth is not the only factor which informs her
decision making. Shelley also explained how it was important that the courts continue to trust Shelley
and YPVS organizations to support young people to attend court dates as scheduled without
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additional charges. A second program example of penultimate power can be found in Extra-Judicial
Sanctions where missed appointments with YPVS workers are often reflected in the completion
letter to the Crown Attorney which summarizes youth participation and whether the extra-judicial
sanction program has been completed. YPVS workers take care to explain the context for missed
appointments, demeanor and behaviour while in YPVS programming and whether the program was
successfully completed. Based on this communication, the Crown Attorney decides whether the
young person has satisfied the requirements of the Extra-Judicial Sanction.
As alluded to by Shelley above, the exercise of YPVS penultimate power is often after a
young person has been warned that such conduct would result in the YPVS worker reporting this
conduct to the criminal justice system. This means that the coerciveness of statutory criminal justice
agencies is ever-present (if even only in the shadows) of everyday YPVS work. In this way, the
tandem arrangement between the YPVS and the criminal justice system is not sequential or
oscillating between exclusionary and inclusionary. Rather, there is an ability for exclusionary and
inclusionary practice to be present simultaneously while reconstituting each other (Gray and Salole,
2006). In addition, it is important to note that the YPVS can be disciplinary and punitive without
using their penultimate power. Indeed, YPVS work includes incarceration, surveillance and
correction, however, this more coercive nature of YPVS work is often obscured by the supposition
that the sector is comparatively gentler and a “lesser harm” when compared to the statutory
criminal justice system. Importantly, this “lesser than” claim can only be made in relation to the
statutory criminal justice system.
The YPVS reporting conduct about youth clients not meeting their expectations to the
criminal justice system, does not necessarily (nor reliably) result in the young person experiencing
exclusionary effects – this decision ultimately lies with probation or the courts. For example, in this
investigation YPVS worker Ray explained that while he is mostly in agreement when Probation
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Officers breach a young person for not following a probation order, he has been surprised when
Probation Officers file charges unexpectedly (“I really thought he was going to give this kid another
chance)”. Conversely, YPVS worker Ray has also been surprised when Probation Officers did not
breach a young person when Ray expected they would. Ray explains,
There’s been a few times where I’ve been shocked, they didn’t breach them. There was
one kid who was impossible to control. Always picking fights with staff and other kids
in group. He didn’t listen to anyone and was a real terror. So, we don’t tell probation
right away about this stuff. We wait. We try to sort it out ourselves, but we could not
get to this kid to even pretend he was paying attention to us. And he was really
disruptive. And after this one day we’d all had it with him. And we told him, and we
thought we would never see him again. And so, we did a case conference and we
document everything about what this kid has done. We told this kids PO [Probation
Officer] and then nothing. This kid was allowed to be completely out of control. He
showed up to group next week like nothing happened.
A gap exists between YPVS workers personal judgment about what ought to happen to youth in
conflict with the law and what actually happens in the criminal justice system. The size of this gap
depends on a range of factors including, but not limited to, the quality of relationships between the
YPVS and the criminal justice system and the structure of the YPVS program. This gap contributes
to the level of faith or trust YPVS workers have in the criminal justice system and informs the way
they understand and relate to their penultimate power. Ray’s experience is an example of how some
YPVS workers have a low level of authority about which youth attend their programming.
Importantly, other YPVS workers explained that they have built strong relationships with probation
officers which results in a higher level of predictability. In the case of working with Probation
Officers, the MCYS (2013) probation framework specifies “as the case manager, the Probation
Officer receives information on all services and so is in a unique leadership position...” (p.10). This
wording alludes to a tension regarding division of labour and responsibility between probation and
the YPVS.
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Coordinating and Managing Gaps
Both YPVS workers and criminal justice workers explain how the distance between the YPVS and
the criminal justice system is context specific and shifts to suit various purposes. First, the gap helps
to differentiate the YPVS from the criminal justice system to their youth clients. Accordingly, YPVS
workers manage the gap between YPVS organizations and the criminal justice system by
accentuating the gap to clients in order to gain investment from young people about YPVS work.
Donohue and Moore (2009) describe how constructing offenders into an active empowered client,
“serves the very particular purpose of having people in conflict with the law buy into the
interventions foisted upon them through the justice system” (p. 328). Similarly, YPVS workers
interviewed for this research discussed how it is part of their work to demarcate their approach from
the police, courts or probation that refer youth in conflict with the law to them (see also Tomczak,
2017). This demarcation is especially important in YPVS worker’s communication with their youth
clients. Arundeep explains how she uses a variety of “social work skills” in order to establish rapport
and differentiate the YPVS from the criminal justice system in the intake session for her work at an
Attendance Centre.
There is this pretty elaborate intake process. Youth sign forms about their rights and
confidentiality and that’s important for them to know about their rights but also we
want them to know that something different is happening now. This is a new
relationship between them and [the YPVS organization]….I have to get him to open
up. I ask open-ended questions like: Why did the judge refer you to the program? And
then I also ask relationship questions about a relationship they value. What do you
think your Dad would like to see you achieve in this program? And that’s how I hook
them. I try to get them to see the judge referred them to me but that doesn’t mean you
or your family can’t get something out of it too. It’s really important that they value
their time with me.
Arundeep explains that she is trying to establish that ‘someone else’ is mandating the young person to
be referred to the YPVS and that the youth “may as well buy into the process” because there may be
positive consequences of the young person’s engagement in the YPVS. This client-based approach,
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prominent in social work and other ‘helping professions’, is tethered to a common power
configuration in which the aim is to engage clients in a “democratic egalitarian manner” (Epstein 1999:
p.8) to facilitate client change “without force, without command, indirectly. It must not be
authoritative. It must enable its clients to be transformed, to adopt normative ways and thought
voluntarily” (p.8). Thus, Arundeep communicates a wide gap between the YPVS and the criminal
justice system because it further aligns Arundeep with inclusionary practice.
Criminal justice workers also recognized that the gap between their work and the PVS has value.
Nevon, a Police Officer, describes, “they (PVS workers) are able to take the time, where we really
can’t” (Nevon, Police Officer) and “NGO’s (non-governmental organizations] are able to go the extra
mile” (Frank, Probation Officer). Further, it was noted how the coercive nature of the criminal justice
system undermines their ability to forge relationships with youth. Research respondent Greg explained
that as a Police Officer he can,
..put certain demands on people. So a lot of my conversations with young people
are not voluntary. That changes everything. No matter what people are not going
to think that I really just care about young people. I don’t think that’s why people
get into this work. If that’s what people wanted to do –they wanted to care – they
wanted to do social development, they wouldn’t be a Police Officer. We might have
exceptional days but it’s not part of our job description.
Here, Greg suggests that the there are limits to the degree he is able to be perceived as inclusionary
because of the nature of policing work. Greg also suggested that as a result of the priority placed on
the exclusionary role of policing, referring youth to the YPVS is more inclusionary because “they
[YPVS] can do it better”.
More than contentions about mandates surrounding inclusionary and exclusionary effects,
there are also constraints surrounding how much time the traditional criminal system has to spend
with youth in conflict with the law in order to be inclusionary. Indeed, the time and care offered by
the YPVS works in tandem with the quickness and terseness offered by the criminal justice system.
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This “good cop/bad cop” arrangement was presented as functional by a number of the research
participants. YPVS worker Carlos explained that being aware of this dynamic was an important part
of his position as a residential counsellor for young people in custody.
By the time they [young people in conflict with the law] come here, by the time they
see me. They have usually had a lot people yell at them, get angry and well, they’ve
burnt a lot of bridges. And so, I can’t do the same. Not only do I know that getting
tough on them is not what they need right now, I am essentially living with these guys
and being a parent to them and to be tough with them isn’t really sustainable. I can’t
be that tough guy 8 hours a day. Police can do that. They just spend a couple hours
with them. I need to build a relationship with them.
As noted by Carlos this governance arrangement also has temporal consequences where YPVS
engagement with young people is longer and more intimate than police engagement with youth.
The tandem arrangement and gap between the criminal justice system and the YPVS also
helps to create a filter so that criminal justice workers, like Probation Officers, are not always privy
to case management information understood as superfluous. For example, Probation Officer
research participant Frank indicated: “I don’t want them [YPVS workers] calling me every time they
[young people in conflict with the law] don’t show up for an appointment. They help to minimize
the minutiae”. For Frank, YPVS programming helps him to focus on more important tasks like the
overall management of his caseload. It is important to note that as a Probation Officer, Frank never
loses the ability acquire information from the YPVS and he could decide that there are some young
people with whom he would like to know the minutiae: when and how many YPVS appointments
they miss.
Unlike popular representations of the “good cop/bad cop” dynamic, the YPVS is not
necessarily colluding with the criminal justice system. Indeed, the considerable gaps and low levels of
coordination between the YPVS and the criminal justice system mean YPVS workers can be
uncertain about how (and whether) their penultimate power will be responded to by statutory
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agencies. For some of those working with young people in conflict with the law, like Arundeep, the
gap between the criminal justice system and the YPVS creates and opportunities to assign new and
different meanings to their work. For other YPVS workers, the lack of coordination can undermine
their authority over their work.

CONCLUSION
The Youth Criminal Justice Act “has re-authorized and re-responsibilized communities, via publicly
funded community-based agencies and services” (Mann et al. 2007). This shift makes the role of the
YPVS in the youth criminal justice system even more significant and important to examine. As
scholars turn to analyse the penal voluntary sector, it is important to consider how the penal
voluntary sector and YPVS work with the criminal justice system. This article examined governance
practices in YPVS organizations in their youth justice work and specifically considered how
seemingly contradictory logics like ‘helping’ and punitiveness can co-exist in the YPVS. The
partnership between the criminal justice system and the YPVS to deliver youth justice services
structures a dynamic between the two entities which invites comparison. Here, the YPVS is
positioned as the gentler response to youth in conflict with the law because they do not have the
same powers and mandate as the criminal justice system. While neither the YPVS nor the criminal
justice system have singular governing approach, a division of labour exists between the two that is
predicated on the YPVS employing a helping logic, and the criminal justice system a punitive logic.
The penultimate power in the YPVS and the distance between the YPVS and the criminal justice
system contributes to the supposition of tandem logics. Examining the criminal justice system and
the YPVS simultaneously helps to build a better understanding of how different approaches and
logics can coexist.
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